The principle on the enforcement of a corporation's right of action which is encapsulated as the rule in Foss v Harbottle has continued to attract discombobulating academic and judicial comments in defining the scope and exceptions to that rule. The recent statutory interventions which are witnessed in the UK and South Africa by redefining the right of the minority shareholders and other persons to intervene in the corporation's right of action are seen by some writers as having extinguished the flame ignited by the decision in Foss v Harbottle. A detailed examination of the real purport of Wigram VC's pronouncement in that case is undertaken, streamlining the rule and the subsequent decisions of courts carving out rooms for departure from the rule. The paper argues that the statutory interventions in jurisdictions under discussion only borders on derivative action which is an exception to the rule. The effect of those statutory provisions on the rule itself is not too significant as would justify the suggestion that the rule is now extinct. Thus, the paper concludes that the rule in Foss v Harbottle remains the principal approach to the enforcement of a corporation's right of action.
INTRODUCTION
Since that famous pronouncement made by Sir James Wigram VC about the middle of the nineteenth century in Foss v Harbottle 1 which accorded judicial recognition to the corporation's right of action in its own name, divergent views have continued to emerge from writers and the judiciary in their restatement of the scope and applications of that rule. This conundrum of views was succinctly captured by French, Mayson and Ryan as follows:
The rule in Foss v Harbottle is the deepest mystery of company law but it is of great practical importance. A lawyer must be able to determine whether his or her client's claim will or will not be heard by the court. So if the client's claim concerns the affairs of a company of which the client is a member, the lawyer must determine whether the claim is an exception to the rule. Unfortunately there is disagreement over defining the rule itself, let alone its exceptions, and the topic has been, and will continue to be, the subject of a vast amount of academic and judicial comment. 2 The parliament in the UK and South Africa seem to have joined the fray, more as arbiters than as combatants. The parliamentary intentions are felt mostly in that aspect of the rule which seeks to draw exceptions rather than modifications of the substantive rule as stated by Wigram VC. The aim seems to be to open a wider window for individuals interventions in corporate matters for the enhanced protection of corporate interests. The significance of those interventions on the common law concept of derivative action has witnessed the description by writers of the rule in Foss v Harbottle as having been consigned to the dustbin of history. 3 The undergoing analysis of judicial decisions and statutory provisions in the UK and South Africa, however, does not seem to lend credence to any suggestion that the rule has been abolished.
THE RULE IN FOSS V HARBOTTLE
The principles laid down in that case which have metamorphosed into an arm of the common law rules of corporate governance relating to the enforcement of corporate rights have been subjected to various interpretations and expatiations by academics and the judiciary. The proper appreciation of what those principles are can be gleaned from the facts and the pronouncement of Sir James Wigram VC upon those facts. The relevant part of the facts that informed the decision of the court are that some of the directors of the company had in their capacity as such, purchased their own land at an over-value for the use of the company. They were also alleged to have mortgaged the land and applied the money raised from the mortgage for payment to themselves of the price of the land. The plaintiffs alleged that the two remaining directors had refused to institute the suit, and showed, in fact, that it would be against their personal interest to do so, inasmuch as they were answerable in respect of the transactions in question; if the plaintiffs could not, therefore, institute the suit themselves they would have no redress. These set of facts were legally reconstructed by Wigram VC reflecting the nature of the alleged injury and the real victim of the wrongdoing as follows: " [t] he Victoria Park Company is an incorporated body, and the conduct with which the Defendants are charged in this suit is an injury not to the Plaintiffs exclusively; it is an injury to the whole corporation by individuals whom the corporation entrusted with powers to be exercised only for the good of the corporation." 4 Upon this foundation was laid the first principle of the enforcement of corporate rights which is described by writers as the 'proper plaintiff principle/rule'. 5 This inference was drawn from that arm of the decision of Wigram VC where he held that "it was not, nor could it successfully be, argued that it was a matter of course for any individual members of a corporation thus to assume to themselves the right of suing in the name of the corporation. In law the corporation and the aggregate members of the corporation are not the same thing for purposes like this." 6 The strength of this finding lies on the distinct legal personality of the company. The fact that a company is separate or distinct from the members has never been in doubt. ) declares ex abundante cautela that a company enjoys juristic personality from the date and time of its incorporation having all the legal powers and capacity of an individual as prescribed by the Act.
The underlying question in this arm of the judgment which recognizes the company as the proper plaintiff and at the same time as a juristic person borders on the rightful persons that could in law institute legal action for and in the name of the company. The artificial nature of the corporate entity invariably deprives the company of that unique character of self will which is inherent in natural persons. Wigram VC had obviously ruled out the individual members as competent persons to seek redress for the company as that would amount to a departure from the rule which, prima facie, would require that the corporation should sue in its own name and in its corporate character.
10 This is a rule of law and practice which is admittedly technical, but founded on the general principles of justice and (1897) AC 22 (HL). Lord Macnaghten's speech at page 51 reflects the court's position. He said: "The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the Memorandum and, although it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustees for them.' In Dimbleby & Sons Ltd v National Union of Journalists [1984] 1 WLR 427 at 435, Lord Diplock explained the essence of this judicial attitude as being "to enable convenience which could only be departed from upon compelling reasons of very urgent character.
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Reading through the company's Act of Incorporation, the judge held that the directors as the governing body are the only ones vested with power to sue in the name of the company. The residuary power lies in the general meeting which could be exercised where the governing body is incapacitated, but no individual incorporators is empowered to sue in the manner proposed by the plaintiffs on the present record.
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The vesting of the company's management powers in the directors has consistently continued to receive judicial approval. This feature of corporate governance has been elevated to the status where any interference by the general meeting is deemed unacceptable by the courts. 13 In Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw 14 Greer LJ was very specific on this issue where he stated that "if powers of management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise these powers. The only way in which the general body of the shareholders can control the exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering their articles, or, if the opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors of whose actions they disapprove."
The importance of shielding the board's management powers from shareholders control founds justification for the paradigm shift of that practice in South Africa from a mere matter of company's internal arrangement to a statutory affair. 15 Section 66(1) of the South African Companies Act, for instance, provides that "[t]he business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company, except to the extent that this Act or the company's Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise." This provision is complemented by the standard set in section 76(4) (a) (iii) of the Act which provides that: (4) In respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the performance of the functions of director, a particular director of a company-(a) will have satisfied the obligations… if-(iii) the director made a decision, or supported the decision of a committee or the board, with regard to that matter, and the director had a rational basis for believing, and did believe, that the decision was in the best interests of the company. 16 Both provisions do not only preclude unwarranted shareholders interference in management powers, but also enjoins respect for decisions honestly taken by the directors which they business to be undertaken with limited financial liability [on the part of the members] in the event of the business proving to be a failure." where he held that there is no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at. In Burland v Earl 18 Lord Davey was very explicit in his objection to any form of judicial interference in matters of internal management of the company and in fact emphasized that the court has no jurisdiction to do so.
The exclusion of shareholders from interfering in management decisions is a strong reason for the courts to exhibit some reluctance in doing so, as the simple question is; if the shareholders as a general meeting cannot interfere in management decisions, why should the courts? The courts cannot be more interested in the running of the affairs of the company than the shareholders themselves except perhaps when the interests of the creditors are involved. 19 Respecting management decisions ensures corporate functionality though the necessary checks and balances should not be rule out. This perhaps is what the parliament had in mind by demanding in that provision that the decision taken by the director should have a 'rational basis'. The requirement of 'rational basis' for decision making demands some level of objectivity in the assessment of the relevant decision to ascertain its sustainability in the context of the director's acclaimed state of mind. An illustration is found in the decision of Jonathan Parker J in Regentcrest plc v Cohen 20 The question is not whether, viewed objectively by the court, the particular act or omission which is challenged was in fact in the interests of the company; still less is the question whether the court, had it been in the position of the director at the relevant time, might have acted differently. Rather, the question is whether the director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the interests of the company. The issue is as to the director's state of mind. No doubt, where it is clear that the act or omission under challenge resulted in substantial detriment to the company, the director will have a harder task persuading the court that he honestly believed it to be in the company ' 22 Hannigan observed that at common law shareholder's remedies are one of the reasons for the rule in Foss v Harbottle. 21 Although Wigram VC did not explicitly state as such, there are sufficient grounds in the judgment to justify such inference.
The second arm of the rule is described as the ratifiability principle or the majority rule. 22 Wigram VC had articulated this principle in his judgment where he said:
The complaint is that those trustees have sold lands to themselves, ostensibly for the benefit of the cestui que trusts. The proposition I have advanced is that, although the Act should prove to be voidable, the cestui que trusts may elect to confirm it. Now, who are the cestui que trusts in this case? The corporation, in a sense, is undoubtedly the cestui que trust; but the majority of the proprietors at a special general meeting assembled, independently of any general rules of law upon the subject, by the very terms of the incorporation in the present case, has power to bind the whole body, and every individual corporator must be taken to have come into the corporation upon the terms of being liable to be so bound. How then can this Court act in a suit constituted as this is, if it is to be assumed, for the purposes of the argument, that the powers of the body of the proprietors are still in existence, and may lawfully be exercised for a purpose like that I have suggested? Whilst the Court may be declaring the acts complained of to be void at the suit of the present Plaintiffs, who in fact may be the only proprietors who disapprove of them, the governing body of proprietors may defeat the decree by lawfully resolving upon the confirmation of the very acts which are the subject of the suit. 23 The principle was reaffirmed even more explicitly by the same Judge in Bagshaw v Eastern Union Railway Co 24 where he stated that if the act, though it be the act of the directors only, be one which a general meeting of the company could sanction, a bill by some of the shareholders, on behalf of themselves and others, to impeach that act cannot be sustained, because a general meeting of the company might immediately confirm and give validity to the act of which the bill complains. Successive court decisions have continued to expatiate and explain the practicalities of this principle. 25 But those decisions are mired in controversy in defining what is or is not ratifiable by the majority of the members. 26 29 where the judge held that fraud lies, not in the character of the act or transaction giving rise to the cause of action, but in the use of the voting power by the controlling shareholders/directors to ratify the transaction, could resolve the controversy. That decision draws a line between the majority and the minority shareholders and locates fraud in a ratification process which places the minority shareholders at a disadvantage. This is not, however, suggesting that fraud cannot also be found on the character of a transaction. The expropriation of corporate opportunities and self-dealing by the directors are good instances of fraud founded on the character of the transaction. 30 Although it is accepted that the shareholders could ratify frauds arising from the directors breach of duty in certain circumstances, there is still an underlying controversy relating to the nature of the transaction and in what circumstances a ratification would be allowed.
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These discombobulated judicial decisions on the issue of ratification demanded parliamentary intervention. When that intervention came, it was not geared at defining the conduct that is ratifiable or not, but rather the effect of such ratification or ratifiability of a particular conduct on the minority shareholders right of action. The provisions toeing this innovative path are found in sections 263 and 165 of the UK and South African Companies Acts respectively. The intrinsic impact of those provisions on the second arm of Wigram VC's decision seems to form the basis upon which the suggestion is made by some writers that the rule in Foss v Harbottle is now extinct. 32 
DERIVATIVE ACTION
Derivative action is a common law device by which the shareholder is allowed to seek redress for and on behalf of the company for an injury done to the company. This meaning is now statutorily recognized in the UK and affirmed in recent judicial decisions.
33
The first description of a minority shareholder right of action for an injury to the company as derivative action was made by the United States Supreme Court. 34 The aim was to address the real owner of the right of action which is the company. The shareholder's right to sue is thus derived from the company.
Prior to the US court pronouncement on this concept, the English courts have dealt with this type of action more as a representative action by the shareholder on behalf of the company. 35 The circuitous nature of the proceedings then was described by Lord Denning MR The passage explicitly demonstrates what the rule in Foss v Harbottle entails, i.e., that the company itself is the only person to sue for the damage done to it. The right of the minority shareholder to sue which could only be triggered when the company's right of action is incapacitated due to the involvement in wrongdoing by the relevant organ that would have instituted action for the company is not an intrinsic part of that rule. Indeed, in Foss, Wigram VC had described the shareholders action as a 'departure' from the rule 40 and an 'anomalous form of suit' which he could not see any reason why it should be resorted to when the powers of the corporation could be called into exercise. 41 A further confirmation that the minority shareholders' right of action was not the concern of the court is buttressed by the finding by Wigram VC that "during the years 1840, 1841 and 1842 there was a governing body, that by such body the business of the company was carried on, that there was no insurmountable impediment to the exercise of the powers of the proprietors assembled in general meetings to control the affairs of the company, and that such general meetings were actually held."
42 Thus, as the relevant organs of the company that could seek redress in the name of the company were all active, there was no basis for the consideration of the minority shareholders right of action on behalf of the company. This position of the law was recently given credence by Lewison J 
in Iesini & Ors v Westrip Holdings Ltd & Ors
43 where the Judge held that whether a company should bring proceedings to redress a wrong was a matter that was to be decided by the company internally; that is to say by its board of directors, or by a majority of its shareholders if dissatisfied by the board's decision and that the court would not second guess a decision made by the company in accordance with its own constitution.
Subsequent court decisions have, as such, consistently referred to the minority shareholders right of action as encapsulated by the concept of derivative action as an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. In Burland v Earle 44 Lord Davey had recognised that the cardinal principle is that company should sue for an injury done to it as laid down in Foss v Harbottle, but that an exception is made where the persons against whom the relief is sought are themselves in control of the majority of the shares in the company, and will not permit action to be brought in the name of the company. C for an injury done by B to C. C is the proper plaintiff because C is the party injured, and, therefore, the person in whom the cause of action is vested. This is sometimes referred to as the 'Rule in Foss v Harbottle'" Similarly, in Cinematic Finance Ltd v Ryder 46 Roth J observed that the general rule is that a cause of action vesting in a company should be pursued by the company and not by its shareholders. A similar approach was adopted by the South African court in Hillcrest Village (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nedbank Limited and Others 47 where Mavundla J held that save for certain exceptions, in general, when a wrong is alleged to have been done to a company the proper plaintiff to sue the wrongdoer is the company itself.
A derivative action is conceived as an exception to the rule in Foss to deal with the particular circumstances when the company cannot or will not bring an action against the alleged wrongdoer. In Edwards v Halliwell 48 Jenkins LJ observed that the rule in Foss is not an inflexible rule and will be relaxed where necessary in the interest of justice. Wigram VC did not, however, relax the rule in Foss. Although there are statements in the judgment suggesting positive disposition of the judge in that regard, 49 the facts as pleaded did not give room for a consideration of that possibility.
The rule itself is a substantive rule bordering on the powers of the company to conduct its own affairs as a juristic entity. The exception referred to as derivative action is described by the court as a 'mere matter of procedure designed to afford remedy to the company for wrong which would otherwise escape redress'. 50 It simply lays down when and how the minority shareholder may seek redress for wrong done to the company. Such power is secondary in nature and cannot extinguish the primary and substantive rule on which its existence is predicated.
This submission, however, does not put an end to the ensuing controversy over that rule. The second arm of the rule that denies the minority shareholder a right of action where the wrong is ratifiable by a majority of the shareholders seems to have fallen severely under the weight of the statutory innovation. Section 263(2)(c) which is contained in Part 11 of the UK Companies Act that deals generally with the concept of derivative action directs the courts to decline permission to commence a derivative action if the court is satisfied that:
(c) where the cause of action arises from an act or omission that has already occurred, that the act or omission-(i) was authorised by the company before it occurred, or (ii) has been ratified by the company since it occurred.
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[2010] EWHC 3387 (Ch) para 9.
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[1950] 2 All ER 1064 at 1067.
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For instance, at page 204 para 494, the judge stated that "[i]n order then that this suit may be sustained it must be shown either that there is no such power as I have supposed remaining in the proprietors, or, at least, that all means have been resorted to and found ineffectual to set that body in motion: this latter point is nowhere suggested in the bill."
Factors which the court should consider in deciding whether or not to grant permission to commence an action are also set down in section 263(3) and include:
(c) where the cause of action results from an act or omission that is yet to occur, whether the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would be likely to be-(i) authorised by the company before it occurs, or (ii) ratified by the company after it occurs.
A distinctive feature of subsection 2(c) is that actual ratification forecloses the right of action. But that provision does not foreclose the power of the court to examine the validity of the ratification process. That position was adopted by Hodge QC sitting as a Judge of the High Court in Singh v Singh 51 where the judge declined to grant permission on the ground that the conduct on the part of the first defendant of which the complaint is made has been 'effectively' ratified by the company. The emphasis is on 'effective' ratification and not just mere ratification. A ratification to be effective must satisfy the threshold laid down in section 239 of the Act relating to disqualification from voting by interested wrongdoer and connected persons. The judicial power to scrutinise the ratification process is strengthened by section 239(7) which provides that section 239 does not affect any other enactment or rule of law imposing additional requirements for valid ratification or any rule of law as to acts that are incapable of being ratified by the company. Although the position at common law, remains uncertain as to what is or is not ratifiable, and it has in fact been held by the court that there is no limit to the power of the majority to ratify an act or transaction, 52 what is certain is that the circumstances or process of ratification can be inquired into by the court. This legal position is buttressed by the decision of Knox J in Smith v Croft (No 2) 53 to the effect that the ultimate, question has to be…: is the plaintiff being prevented improperly from bringing these proceedings on behalf of the company? If it is an expression of… an appropriate independent organ that is preventing the plaintiff from prosecuting the action he is not improperly but properly prevented and so the answer to the question is No. The appropriate independent organ will vary according to the constitution of the company concerned and the identity of the defendants, who will in most cases he disqualified from participating by voting in expressing the corporate will.
The provision set down in section 263(2)(c) differs from Wigram VC's position in Foss in that the provision emphasises actual ratification as against mere prospect of the conduct being ratified which was the concern of the court in Foss. The prospect of ratification does not bar derivative proceedings under at 307 per Vinellot J who held that there is no obvious limit to the power of the majority to authorise or ratify an act or transaction whatever its character provided that the majority does not have an interest which conflicts with the interests of the company. The South African Companies Act of 2008 embodies extensive provisions on derivative action in section 165. Apart from subsections 1 and 2 of that section (which clumsily runs up to subsection 16) all other provisions in that section are matters of procedure. While subsection 1 provides statutory route to a derivative action, subsection 2 redefines the scope of persons that may institute derivative proceedings to protect the interests of the company. 55 The provision of subsection 1 of section 165 deserves some attention as it forms the basis upon which the suggestion is made that the rule in Foss v Harbottle is now abolished in South African. That provision is as follows:
Any right at common law of a person other than a company to bring or prosecute any legal proceedings on behalf of that company is abolished, and the rights in this section are in substitution for any such abolished right. On issue of procedure, although the Act now provides an alternative route for a derivative action, this does not suggest that those standards set at common law for granting of leave to the applicant to prosecute this type of action are also abolished. In fact some of those conditions set down by the Act as prerequisites for bringing of a derivative action remain either explicitly or implicitly the same as under the common law. This is buttressed by the provision of section 165(5) which requires that the court may grant leave only if satisfied, among other conditions, that the applicant is acting in good faith, and that the action is in the interests of the company. 57 In Mouritzen v Greystone Enterprises (Pty) Ltd & Another 58 where this provision was considered, Ndlovu J observed that in most, but not all, instances both requirements would overlap. An instance where a person does not act in good faith but is driven by an ulterior motive, such as personal vendetta, will generally not be in the best interests of the company. If a broad view of these concepts is taken by the court, it cannot realistically arrive at a fair decision by shutting its eyes to the position of the wrongdoer either within or outside the company when brought to the attention of the court. That of course is a common law position on this type of action. 59 An illustration is found in the Australian case of Swansson v Pratt 60 where Palmer J observed that an action sought to be instituted by a former shareholder with a history of grievances against the current majority of shareholders or the current board may be easier to characterize as brought for the purpose of satisfying nothing more than the applicant's private vendetta. An applicant with such a purpose would not be acting in good faith even when the alleged wrongdoers are seemingly in control of the company. In Mouritzen's case 61 Ndlovu J expressed the view that factual proof of any pre-existing personal animosity between the parties, as in that case, does not per se serve as conclusive proof that any person referred to in section 165(2) of the Act is not acting in good faith in serving a demand under that subsection, or instituting an application under section 165(5). However, personal animosity between the opposed parties is an important factor which the Court will always take into account together with other relevant evidentiary material presented before the Court in a given situation, in determining whether or not an applicant has, on a balance of probabilities, satisfied the 'good faith' requirement. The reference to 'other evidential material' is an indication that the factors which could be considered by the court as provided in section 165(5) of the Act are not exclusive and would as such include the relationship or position of the wrongdoer in the company.
There are no mandatory grounds for declining leave as is the case under the English law, but one of the factors which should inform the decision of the court and is of primary importance to this discourse is found in section 165 (14) of the Act which provides as follows: (14) If the shareholders of a company have ratified or approved any particular conduct of the company-(a) the ratification or approval-(i) does not prevent a person from making a demand, applying for leave, or bringing or intervening in proceedings with leave under this section; and (ii) does not prejudice the outcome of any application for leave, or proceedings brought or intervened in with leave under this section; or (b) the court may take that ratification or approval into account in making any judgment or order. A decision by the board, or a transaction or agreement approved by the board, or by a company…, is valid despite any personal financial interest of a director or person related to the director, only if -(a) it was approved following disclosure of that interest in the manner contemplated in this section; or (b) despite having been approved without disclosure of that interest, it -(i) has subsequently been ratified by an ordinary resolution of the shareholders following disclosure of that interest.
This provision implies that ratification is valid if effectively obtained as prescribed by law. Thus, the requirement of section 165(14)(b) that the court may take the ratification into account in arriving at its decision should be read as an obligation on the court to examine the effectiveness or validity of the ratification as provided in section 75 of the Act. It is important that such consideration should be undertaken by the court at the early stages of the proceedings when leave is sought as it is done under the English law 63 to prevent a long drawn litigation on a wrong which has become extinct following an effective ratification process. Thus, the major difference between the statutory position in South Africa as under the English law and the rule in Foss remains that the former emphasises effective ratification and not just a mere prospect of ratification as in the latter as a vitiating factor for an individual's right of action to vindicate a wrong done to the company.
CONCLUSION
The fact that in both jurisdictions there are presently elaborate statutory provisions on derivative action are simply not sustainable as ground for any suggestion that the rule in Foss v Harbottle is now extinct. Dignam and Lowry had observed in relation to the UK Companies Act provisions that:
If we compare the language of ss 261-264 with the common law rule it replaces, it is apparent that there is little or no change of emphasis in terms of formulation. The focus of the rule laid down in Foss v Harbottle and its jurisprudence was on prohibiting claims unless one of the exceptions to the rule was satisfied. The statutory language similarly proceeds from the rather negative standpoint that the court must (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) in dismissing application for leave to commence a derivative action held that "this is a clear case where permission to bring a derivative claim should be refused…, the principal reason for that is that the conduct on the part of the first defendant of which complaint is made is conduct that was either authorised by the company before it occurred, or has effectively been ratified by the company since then."
dismiss the application or claim in the circumstances specified in [the Act].
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In Cinematic Finance Ltd v Ryder & Ords 65 Roth J affirmed the subsistence of the rule in Foss inspite of the statutory provisions where he said:
I accept that proceedings for a derivative claim are now comprehensively governed by the Act. But in my judgment the Act is not seeking to change the basic rule that a claim that lies in a company can be pursued only by the company or to disturb the fundamental distinction between a company and its shareholders. There is nothing to suggest that the Act intended such a radical reversal of long-standing and fundamental principles.
The position adopted by the Judge finds credence, as stated by Roth J, in the Report of the Law Commission on Shareholder Remedies which states inter alia: "(i) Proper plaintiff Normally the company should be the only party entitled to enforce a cause of action belonging to it. Accordingly, a member should be able to maintain proceedings about wrongs done to the company only in exceptional circumstances." 66 Thus, in Bamford v Harvey 67 Roth J declined to grant permission to commence a derivative action where the company is in a position to initiate proceedings in its own name. Similarly, in
Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords Association
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Judge Pelling QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) adopted a stance which is reminiscent of Wigram VC's position in Foss by declining to grant permission where the claimant is found to be in a position to "requisition an EGM, obtain if he can a replacement Board and that Board can if it judges it appropriate to do so, applying the duties imposed upon them by Sections 172, authorise the litigation."
The major achievement of the statutory provisions in both jurisdictions is that the law now prescribes more flexible criteria than the 'wrongdoer control' and 'fraud on minority' exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, 69 thus making the concept of derivative action more easily accessible by the shareholders and other persons who are given the right of action under the statute. Thus, a decision such as that handed down by Mavundla J in Hillcrest Village (Pty) 
Ltd and Another v Nedbank Limited and Others
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where the Judge declined to allow a derivative action on the ground that none of the defendants were either directors or shareholders nor that any majority of such directors or shareholders as constituted were among the defendants, but on the contrary the defendants were all outsiders, i.e. persons not being directors and or shareholders of the company, may no long stand as good law in South Africa. But the fact that the company is the proper plaintiff to vindicate any wrong done to it as a juristic person, a position which was indisputably articulated by Wigram VC in Foss, remains as potent under the existing statutory arrangements in both the UK and South Africa, as it was at common law.
